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THE	  ADMINISTRATIVE	  TRIBUNAL	  OF	  THE	  INTERNATIONAL	  LABOUR	  ORGANIZATION	  
(ILOAT),	  THE	  INTERNATIONAL	  COURT	  OF	  JUSTICE	  (ICJ)	  AND	  THE	  RIGHT	  OF	  ACCESS	  TO	  
JUSTICE	  FOR	  THE	  STAFF	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  ORGANIZATIONS:	  THE	  NEED	  FOR	  A	  
REFORM	  IN	  LIGHT	  OF	  THE	  ICJ	  ADVISORY	  OPINION	  OF	  1	  FEBRUARY	  2012•*	  	  
Daniele	  Gallo**	  	  	   Abstract	  	   With	   the	  Advisory	  Opinion	  of	  February	  2012	  on	   Judgment	  No.	  2867	  of	   the	   ILOAT	  the	   ICJ	  choose	  to	  acknowledge,	  once	  and	  for	  all,	  the	  limits	  of	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  ILOAT	  –	  limits	  it	  had	  already	  emphasized	  in	  previous	  advisory	  opinions	  on	  judgments	  of	  the	  UNAT	  and	  ILOAT.	  Moreover,	   it	   has	   brought	   attention	   to	   the	   new	   UN	   internal	   justice	   system	   and,	   finally,	  questioned	   the	   compatibility	  of	   the	  procedure	  provided	   for	  by	  Art.	  XII	  of	   the	   ILOAT	  Statute	  with	  the	  “present-­‐day	  principle	  of	  equality	  of	  access	  to	  courts	  and	  tribunals”.	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	   main	   argument	   implied	   in	   the	   paper	   is	   that	   international	   organizations	   should	   take	  measures	  to	  establish	  an	  appellate	  tribunal.	  It	   is	   the	   ILOAT	   that,	   insofar	   as	   the	   most	   representative	   of	   international	   administrative	  tribunals,	   should	   take	   the	   initiative.	   Indeed,	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   provisions	   governing	  employment	   relationships,	   the	   development,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   uniform	   interpretation	   and	  application,	  of	  the	  internal	  law	  of	  international	  organizations	  must	  be	  ensured,	  rather	  than	  by	  the	  ICJ,	  by	  international	  administrative	  tribunals.	  Due	  to	  their	  nature	  and	  mission,	  the	   latter	  are	  better	  equipped	  to	  settle	  staff	  disputes	  between	  an	  international	  organization	  and	  its	  staff	  members.	  	  	  	   SUMMARY:	   1.	   The	   ICJ	   Advisory	  Opinion	   of	   1	   February	   2012	   on	   Judgment	  No.	   2867	   of	   the	  ILOAT	   as	   a	   privileged	   sedes	   materiae	   to	   grasp	   the	   main	   criticalities	   concerning	   the	  relationship	   between	   international	   administrative	   tribunals	   and	   the	   ICJ,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   law	  governing	  the	  access	  to	  justice	  of	  international	  officials.	  –	  2.	  The	  “Mrs	  Ana	  Teresa	  Saez	  García	  v.	  International	  Fund	  for	  Agricultural	  Development	  (IFAD)	  affair”	  before	  the	  ILOAT:	  the	  factual	  background,	   the	  history	  of	   the	  proceedings	  and	   the	  Tribunal’s	   reasoning.	   –	  3.	  The	  Advisory	  Opinion	  of	   the	  ICJ.	  –	  3.1.	  The	  scope	  of	   the	  Court’s	   jurisdiction	  and	  power	  of	  review.	  3.2.	  The	  merits	   and	   the	   response(s)	   to	   the	   questions	   submitted	   by	   IFAD:	   the	   jurisdiction	   ratione	  
personae	  and	  ratione	  materiae	  of	  the	  ILOAT	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  any	  fundamental	  procedural	  fault	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Tribunal.	  3.3.	  The	  problems	  concerning	  the	  lack	  of	   jus	  standi	  and	   jus	  locus	  
standi	   in	   judicio	   before	   the	   Court.	   3.4.	   Some	   remarks	   on	   Cançado	   Trinidade’s	   innovative	  separate	  opinion:	  is	  the	  recognition	  of	  international	  subjectivity	  of	  individuals	  the	  only	  way	  to	  secure	  the	  right	  of	  access	  to	   justice	   for	   international	  officials?	  –	  4.	  A	  critical	  appraisal	  of	   the	  Court’s	   reasoning:	   is	   the	   ICJ	   the	   right	   judge	   to	   decide	   disputes	   between	   international	  organizations	  and	  their	  staff?	  –	  5.	  The	  limits	  of	  the	  law	  governing	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	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** Since January 2014 qualified as Associate Professor of International Law and EU Law. 
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ILOAT	  and	  the	  ICJ	  and	  the	  need	  for	  the	  provision	  of	  an	  appellate	  tribunal	  within	  the	  internal	  justice	  systems	  of	  international	  organizations.	  	   1.	  As	  is	  well	  known,	  the	  statutes	  of	  most	  international	  organizations	  provide	  that	  disputes	  concerning	  employment	  relations	  between	  the	  organization	  and	  its	  staff	  must	  be	  settled,	  as	  a	  last	  resort	  –	   i.e.	   in	  compliance	  with	  the	  (customary)	  rule	  on	  the	  prior	  exhaustion	  of	   internal	  administrative	  (non-­‐strictly	  jurisdictional)	  remedies1	  –,	  by	  administrative	  tribunals	  instituted	  by	  the	  same	  organizations	  or,	  alternatively,	  by	  tribunals	  of	  other	  international	  organizations2.	  In	   the	   latter	   case,	   the	   two	   organizations	   in	   question	   enter	   into	   an	   agreement	   that	   the	  organization	   to	   which	   the	   international	   official	   belongs	   will	   accept	   and	   recognize	   the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  organization	  that	  established	  the	  tribunal.	  In	  particular,	  as	  provided	  for	  by	  Art.	  II.5	  of	  its	  Statute3,	  the	  Administrative	  Tribunal	  of	  the	  International	   Labour	   Organization	   (ILOAT)4	   currently	   exercises	   its	   competence	   over	   staff	  disputes	   involving,	   besides	   the	   International	   Labour	   Organization	   (ILO),	   58	   international	  institutions	  (and	  their	  staff)5.	  In	  accordance	  with	  Art.	  VI.1	  of	  the	  ILOAT	  Statute,	  the	  judgments	  rendered	  by	  the	  Tribunal	  “shall	  be	  final	  and	  without	  appeal”.	  However,	  the	  Statute	  contains	  a	  crucial	  caveat,	  since	  Art.	  XII.1	  states	  that:	  “[i]n	  any	  case	  in	  which	  the	  Governing	  Body	  of	  the	  International	  Labour	  Office	  or	   the	   Administrative	   Board	   of	   the	   Pensions	   Fund	   challenges	   a	   decision	   of	   the	   Tribunal	  confirming	   its	   jurisdiction,	   or	   considers	   that	   a	   decision	   of	   the	   Tribunal	   is	   vitiated	   by	   a	  fundamental	  fault	  in	  the	  procedure	  followed,	  the	  question	  of	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  decision	  given	  by	   the	   Tribunal	   shall	   be	   submitted	   by	   the	   Governing	   Body,	   for	   an	   advisory	   opinion,	   to	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 On both the legal status and the application of such rule within international organizations see, inter alia, Alain Pellet, 
Les voies de recours ouvertes aux fonctionnaires internationaux (Paris: Pedone, 1982), 84-85; Philippe Sands and 
Pierre Klein, The Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (6th edn. London: Sweet & Maxwell), 2009, 426. 
2 On the international administrative tribunals see generally and most recently Jan Klabbers, An Introduction to 
International Institutional Law (2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 269-273; Philippe Sands and 
Pierre Klein, The Bowett’s Law, 421-434; Anna Riddell, “Administrative Boards, Commissions and Tribunals in 
International Organizations”, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, ed. Rüdiger Wolfrum (Oxford: 
OUP, 2012), 66-77; Henry G. Schermers and Niels Blokker, International Institutional Law. Unity within Diversity (5th 
edn. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2011), 462-467; Chittharanjan Félix Amerasinghe, “Reflections on the Internal Judicial 
Systems of International Organizations”, in The Development and Effectiveness of International Administrative Law, 
ed. Olufemi Elias (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), 33-58; Pedro Dallari, “Administrative Tribunals of International 
Organizations and World Constitutionalism”, ivi, 59-68; Olufemi Elias and Melissa Thomas, “Administrative Tribunals 
of International Organizations”, in The rules, practice, and jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals, ed. 
Chiara Giorgetti (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), 159-190; Benedict Kingsbury and Richard Stewart, “Administrative 
Tribunals of International Organizations from the Perspective of the Emerging Global Administrative Law”, in The 
Development, ed. Elias, 69-104; Angela Del Vecchio, International Courts and Tribunals between Globalization and 
Localism (The Hague: Eleven, 2013), 50-55; Claudio Zanghì, Diritto delle organizzazioni internazionali (3rd edn. 
Turin: Giappichelli, 2013), 234-240. 
3 “The Tribunal shall also be competent to hear complaints alleging non-observance, in substance or in form, of the 
terms of appointment of officials and of provisions of the Staff Regulations of any other international organization […] 
which has addressed to the Director-General a declaration recognizing, in accordance with its Constitution or internal 
administrative rules, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for this purpose, as well as its Rules of Procedure, and which is 
approved by the Governing Body”. 
4 The Tribunal was established on 9 October 1946 in the frame of the International Labour Conference and replaced the 
Administrative Tribunal of the League of Nations, which was competent from 1927 to 1946. Its Statute was adopted on 
the same day by the Conference and subsequently amended in 1949, 1986, 1992, 1998 and 2008. 
5 In general, on the ILOAT see, ex multis, Frank Gutteridge, “The ILO Administrative Tribunal”, in International 
Administration. Law and Management Practice in International Organizations, ed. Chris De Cooker (5th edn. Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), 1-33; on the ILO see Heiko Sauer, “International Labour Organization”, in Max Planck 
Encyclopedia, ed. Wolfrum (Oxford: OUP, 2012), 810-820.  
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International	   Court	   of	   Justice”.	   Moreover,	   Art.	   XII	   of	   the	   Annex	   to	   the	   Statute	   extends	   the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (ICJ)	  to	  the	  case	  in	  which	  the	  challenge	  of	  the	  Tribunal’s	   decision	   is	  made	   by	   the	   executive	   boards	   of	   international	   organizations	   –	   other	  than	   the	   ILO	   –	  which	   have	  made	   the	  declaration	   specified	   in	  Art.	   II.5	   of	   the	   Statute.	   In	   this	  regard,	  it	  must	  be	  recalled	  that	  Art.	  XII.2	  provides	  that	  the	  opinion	  given	  by	  the	  ICJ	  “shall	  be	  binding”.	  Art.	  XII	  must	  be	  read	  in	  conjunction	  with	  both	  Art.	  65.1	  of	  the	  ICJ	  Statute6	  and	  Art.	  96	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter7.	  The	   first	  provides	   that	   “[t]he	  Court	  may	  give	  an	  advisory	  opinion	  on	  any	   legal	  question	   at	   the	   request	   of	  whatever	   body	  may	   be	   authorized	   by	   or	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	  Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  to	  make	  such	  a	  request”.	  The	  second	  states,	  in	  its	  paragraph	  1,	  that:	  “[t]he	  General	  Assembly	  or	  the	  Security	  Council	  may	  request	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice	   to	   give	   an	   advisory	   opinion	   on	   any	   legal	   question”.	  Moreover,	   in	   its	   paragraph	   2,	   it	  specifies	   that	   “[o]ther	   organs	   of	   the	  United	  Nations	   and	   specialized	   agencies,	  which	  may	   at	  any	  time	  be	  so	  authorized	  by	  the	  General	  Assembly,	  may	  also	  request	  advisory	  opinions	  of	  the	  Court	  on	  legal	  questions	  arising	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  their	  activities”.	  	  Furthermore,	   when	   what	   is	   at	   stake	   is	   the	   request	   of	   an	   advisory	   opinion	   made	   by	   an	  international	   organization	   other	   than	   the	   ILO,	   the	   above	   mentioned	   provisions	   apply	   in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  relevant	  rules	  contained	  in	  the	  Relationship	  Agreement	  between	  the	  UN	  and	   that	   organization	   –	   as	   approved	   by	   the	   UN	   General	   Assembly	   –	   by	   which	   the	   former	  recognizes	  the	  latter	  as	  a	  specialized	  agency	  in	  accordance	  with	  Articles	  57	  and	  63	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter	  and	  authorizes	  it	  to	  request	  advisory	  opinions	  of	  the	  ICJ.	  The	  power	  to	  request	  an	  advisory	  opinion	  of	  the	  ICJ	  on	  staff	  disputes	  is	  currently	  available	  to	   the	   ILOAT	  only,	  due	   to	   the	   changes	  occurred	  within	   the	  UN8	   system	  of	  administration	  of	  justice9	  following	  General	  Assembly	  Resolution	  50/54	  of	  11	  December	  199510.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For a comment on such article see, inter alia, Jochen A. Frowein and Karin Oellers-Frahm, “Art. 65”, in The Statute of 
the International Court of Justice. A Commentary, eds. Andreas Zimmermann, Karin Oellers-Frahm, Christian 
Tomuschat, Christian J. Tams (2nd edn. Oxford: OUP, 2012), 1605-1637. 
7 For a comment on such article see, inter alia, “Art. 96”, in The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary, eds. 
Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte, Andreas Paulus (3rd edn. Oxford: OUP, 2012), . 
8 A procedure for the review of the judgments of the UN Administrative Tribunal (UNAT) by the ICJ was established 
by General Assembly Resolution 957 (X) of 8 November 1955, following the ICJ’s advisory opinion of 13 July 1954, 
Effect of Awards of Compensation made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal (ICJ Reports, 1954, 47). This 
power of review, which was envisaged in Art. 11 of the UNAT Statute, was then abolished by General Assembly 
Resolution 50/54 of 11 December 1995 with effect from 1 January 1996. Over this period, three advisory opinions were 
given by the ICJ: Advisory Opinion of 12 July 1973, Application for review of judgment n. 158 of the United Nations 
Administrative Tribunal (ICJ Reports, 1973, 166); Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1982, Application for review of 
judgment n. 237 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal (ICJ Reports, 1982, 325); Advisory Opinion of 27 May 
1987, Application for review of judgment n. 333 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal (ICJ Reports, 1982, 18). 
UNAT (which was established by General Assembly Resolution 351 A(IV) of 24 November 1949) was abolished by 
the General Assembly on 31 December 2009 as result of the General Assembly’s decision to establish a new 
decentralized system including a two-tier formal system comprising a first instance, the UN Dispute Tribunal, and an 
appellate instance, the UN Appeals Tribunal (Resolutions 61/261 of 4 April 2007 and 63/253 of 24 December 2008). 
On the UNAT, its power to request advisory opinions to the ICJ and, more generally, on the former UN judicial system 
see, ex multis, Michael Wood, “United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Applications for Review (Advisory 
Opinions)”, in Max Planck Encyclopedia, ed. Wolfrum (Oxford: OUP, 2012), 209-216. 
9 On the UN internal system of justice currently in force see, inter alia, August Reinisch and Christina Knahr, “From 
the United Nations Administrative Tribunal to the United Nations Appeals Tribunal: Reform of the Administration of 
Justice System Within the United Nations”, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 12 (2008): 447; Phyllis 
Hwang, “Reform of the Administration of Justice System at the United Nations”, The Law and Practice of International 
Courts and Tribunals 8 (2009): 181; Paolo Vargiu, “From Advisory Opinions to Binding Decisions: the New Appeal 
Mechanism of the UN System of Administration of Justice”, International Organizations Law Review 7 (2010): 261; 
Rishi Gulati, “The Internal Dispute Resolution Regime of the United Nations”, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations 
Law 15 (2011): 489; Louise Otis and Eric H. Reiter, “The Reform of the United Nations Administration of Justice 
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This	   essay	   focuses,	   in	   particular,	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   validity	   of	   Judgment	  No.	   2867	   of	   	   3	  February	  2010,	  rendered	  by	  the	  ILOAT	  on	  a	  complaint	  filed	  against	  the	  International	  Fund	  for	  Agricultural	  Development	  (IFAD)11,	  as	  challenged	  by	  the	  latter	  before	  the	  ICJ,	  considering	  that	  IFAD’s	   recognition	   of	   the	   Tribunal’s	   jurisdiction,	   under	   Art.	   II.5	   of	   the	   ILOAT	   Statute,	   took	  effect	  from	  1	  January	  198912.	  The	  ICJ	  rendered	  its	  Opinion	  on	  1	  February	  201213,	  under	  Art.	  65	  of	  its	  Statute,	  almost	  60	  years	  after	  Judgments	  of	  the	  Administrative	  Tribunal	  of	  the	  ILO	  upon	  
Complaints	   Made	   against	   Unesco14	   of	   23	   October	   1956,	   which	   is	   the	   only	   other	   advisory	  opinion	  given	  to	  date	  by	  the	  ICJ	  on	  a	  decision	  rendered	  by	  the	  ILOAT.	  	  In	  its	  Opinion	  of	  February	  2012,	  the	  ICJ	  carried	  out	  an	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	  of	  the	  procedure	  foreseen	  by	  Art.	  XII	  of	  the	  ILOAT	  Statute	  and,	  more	  in	  general,	  of	  the	  powers	  and	  competences	  of	   the	   ILOAT.	   The	   Court’s	   reasoning	   is	   grounded	   on	   the	   ICJ’s	   previous	   jurisprudence	  concerning	   both	   the	   UNAT	   and	   ILOAT.	   Therefore,	   the	   Opinion,	   insofar	   as	   representing	   a	  further	  step	  in	  the	  evolving	  path	  drawn	  so	  far	  by	  the	  Court	  in	  this	  area	  of	  law,	  will	  allow	  me	  to	  make	  some	  observations	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  staff	  disputes	  that	  come	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  not	  only	  of	  the	  ILOAT,	  but	  also	  of	  other	  international	  administrative	  tribunals.	  Indeed,	  the	  ILOAT	  is	  certainly	  the	  most	  representative	  and	  paradigmatic	  international	  administrative	  tribunal,	  as	  shown	  by	  the	  relevant	  number	  of	  judgments	  delivered	  to	  date	  and	  by	  the	  impressive	  number	  of	  international	  organizations	  involved15.	  As	  a	   consequence,	   I	  have	  decided	   to	   focus	  on	   the	   ICJ’s	   recent	  Opinion	   insofar	  as	   it	   is	   the	  privileged	   sedes	  materiae	   to	   highlight	   the	  main	   features	   of	   the	   law	   governing	   the	   access	   of	  international	  organizations’	  staff	  members	  to	  justice	  before	  international	  tribunals,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  ICJ	  and	  ILOAT,	  especially	  in	  terms	  of	  enhancing	  and	  protecting	  both	  the	  jus	  standi	  and	  jus	  locus	  standi	  in	  judicio16	  of	  staff	  members.	  Moreover,	  the	  Opinion	   is	   crucial	   in	   order	   to	   understand	   the	   problems	   which	   arise	   from	   internal	   judicial	  systems	  characterized	  by	  the	   lack	  of	  an	  appellate	  tribunal	   for	  settling	  staff	  disputes,	  such	  as	  the	  one	  provided	  by	   the	   ILO	  and	  other	   international	  organizations	   that	  have	  recognized	   the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  ILOAT.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
System: The United Nations Appeals Tribunal after One Year”, The Law and Practice of International Courts and 
Tribunals 10 (2011): 405; Maritza Struyvenberg, “The New United Nations System of Administration of Justice”, in 
The Development, ed. Elias, 243-251. 
10 On the ICJ case law on the international civil service see, ex multis, David Ruzié, “La CIJ et la fonction publique 
internationale”, in International Law at a Time of Perplexity: Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne, ed. Yoram Dinstein 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1989), 679-98; Joanna Gomula, “The International Court of Justice and Administrative 
Tribunals of International Organizations”, Michigan Journal of International Law 21 (1992): 83; Chittharanjan Félix 
Amerasinghe, “Cases of the International Court of Justice relating to the Employment in International Organizations”, 
in Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice: Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings, eds. Robert J. Vaughan 
Lowe and Malgosia Fitzmaurice (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 193-209 ; Kiyan Homi 
Kaikobad, The International Court of Justice and Judicial Review: A Study of the Court’s Powers with Respect to 
Judgments of the ILO and UN Administrative Tribunals (Kluwer: The Hague, 2000); Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and 
Practice of the International Court 1920-2005. Jurisdiction, (vol. II, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), 949-1020. 
11 See http://www.ilo.org/dyn/triblex/triblexmain.fullText?p_lang=en&p_judgment_no=2867&p_language_code=EN. 
12 Following the approval by the ILO Secretariat of 18 November 1988. 
13 ICJ Reports 2012, 10. 
14 ICJ Reports, 1956, 77. On the case see, amongst others,  Langley Hardy, “Jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal 
of the ILO: The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of October 23 1956”, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 6 (1957): 338. 
15 See supra, in the same §. 
16 On the notion of “standing” before international tribunals see, ex multis, Angela Del Vecchio, “Standing”, in Max 
Planck Encyclopedia, ed. Wolfrum, (Oxford: OUP, 2012), 627-639.  
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2.	  Before	  venturing	  into	  an	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	  of	  the	  ICJ	  Advisory	  Opinion	  of	  February	  2012,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  recall	  the	  main	  facts	  and	  features	  of	  the	  Judgment	  rendered	  by	  the	  ILOAT	  on	  3	  February	  201017.	  The	   complaint	   against	   IFAD	  was	   filed	   with	   the	   on	   8	   July	   2008	   by	  Mrs	   Ana	   Teresa	   Saez	  García.	   She	   maintained	   that:	   (i)	   the	   decision	   not	   to	   renew	   her	   fixed-­‐term	   contract	   as	  Programme	  Manager	   for	  Latin	  American	  and	  Caribbean	  within	   the	  Global	  Mechanism18	  was	  tainted	  with	  abuse	  of	  authority;	  (ii)	  IFAD	  acted	  in	  breach	  of	  its	  duty	  of	  care	  and	  good	  faith;	  and	  (iii)	   the	   termination	   of	   her	   contract	   was	   abrupt,	   unjustified	   and	   damaged	   her	   professional	  reputation.	  That	  decision,	  which	  was	  taken	  on	  15	  December	  2005	  by	  the	  Managing	  Director	  of	  Global	  Mechanism	  and	  was	   based	   on	   the	   abolition	   of	   the	   complainant’s	   post	   for	   reasons	   of	  budgetary	  constraint,	  was	  contrary	  to	  the	  recommendation	  of	  the	  Joint	  Appeals	  Board.	  In	  its	  report	  of	  13	  December	  2007,	  the	  Board	  held,	   inter	  alia,	   that	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  showing	  that	  the	  Managing	  Director	  consulted	  or	  obtained	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  IFAD	  President	  before	  abolishing	  Mrs	  Saez	  García’s	  post.	  By	  a	  memorandum	  of	  4	  April	  2008,	  which	  is	  the	  impugned	  decision	   before	   ILOAT,	   the	   President	   of	   IFAD	   departed	   from	   the	   Board’s	   recommendations	  and,	   by	   doing	   so,	   rejected	   Mrs	   Saez	   García’s	   appeal,	   since	   the	   decision	   not	   to	   renew	   her	  contract	   was	   considered	   to	   be	   in	   accordance	   with	   Sect.	   1.21.1	   of	   the	   Human	   Resources	  Procedures	  Manual,	  which	  provides	  that	  a	  fixed-­‐term	  contract	  expires	  on	  the	  date	  mentioned	  in	  the	  contract.	  	  In	  light	  of	  the	  above,	  Mrs	  Saez	  García	  asked	  the	  Tribunal	  to	  quash	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  IFAD	  President	   dismissing	   her	   appeal	   and	   to	   order	   IFAD	   to	   reinstate	   her,	   for	   a	  minimum	  of	   two	  years,	   in	  her	  previous	  post	  or	   in	  an	  equivalent	  post	   in	  IFAD	  with	  retroactive	  effect,	  claiming	  reimbursement	  for	  loss	  of	  salary	  and	  various	  allowances	  and	  entitlements.	  A	  preliminary	  question	  to	  be	  answered	  by	  the	  Tribunal	  arose	  as	   to	  whether	   the	  Tribunal	  had	  jurisdiction	  and,	  therefore,	  could	  review	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  President	  of	  IFAD.	  The	  crucial	  problem	   thus	   revolved	   around	   the	   status	   of	   the	   Global	  Mechanism,	   in	   its	   relationship	  with	  IFAD.	  The	  Global	  Mechanism,	  as	  a	  body	  of	  the	  UNCCD19,	  is	  housed	  by	  IFAD.	  Its	  functions	  are	  set	  out	  in	  a	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  (MOU)	  signed	  between	  the	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  of	   the	   Convention	   (COP)	   and	   IFAD	   on	   26	   November	   1999.	   It	   provides	   that:	   “the	   Global	  Mechanism	  has	  a	  separate	  identity	  within	  IFAD	  and	  is	  an	  organic	  part	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  Fund	   directly	   under	   the	   President	   of	   the	   Fund”20;	   “the	   Managing	   Director	   of	   the	   Global	  Mechanism	   is	   responsible	   for	   preparing	   the	   Global	   Mechanism’s	   programme	   of	   work	   and	  budget	  […]	  and	  his	  proposals	  are	  reviewed	  and	  approved	  by	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Fund	  before	  being	   forwarded	   to	   the	   Executive	   Secretary	   of	   the	   Convention	   for	   consideration	   in	   the	  preparation	  of	  the	  budget	  estimates	  of	  the	  Convention”21;	  “the	  Managing	  Director,	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Fund,	  will	  submit	  a	  report	  to	  each	  ordinary	  session	  of	  the	  Conference	  on	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  Global	  Mechanism”22.	  According	  to	  IFAD,	  the	  ILOAT	  was	  not	  competent	  to	  hear	  the	  various	  arguments	  raised	  by	  the	   complainant,	   as	   this	   could	   entail	   examining	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   in	   the	   Global	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See http://www.ilo.org/dyn/triblex/triblexmain.fullText?p_lang=en&p_judgment_no=2867&p_language_code=EN. 
18 The Global Mechanism is a specialized body of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those 
Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in Africa (further referred to as UNCCD), 
of 17 June 1994, in force since 26 December 1996.  
19 See Art. 21.4 of the Convention. 
20 See Sect. II.A of the MOU. 
21 See Sect. III.A.4 of the MOU. 
22 See Sect. III.B of the MOU. 
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Mechanism.	  Such	  an	  examination	  could	  not	  be	  admitted	  because:	  the	  Global	  Mechanism	  is	  not	  an	   organ	  of	   the	   Fund;	   it	   is	   accountable	   to	   the	  Conference	   of	   the	  Parties;	   and	   the	   acts	   of	   its	  Managing	  Director	  are	  not	  attributable	  to	  the	  Fund.	  IFAD	  consequently	  took	  the	  view	  that	  its	  role	   should	   be	   restricted	   to	   housing	   the	   Global	   Mechanism,	   which	   has	   a	   separate	   identity	  within	  the	  Fund23.	  Moreover,	  IFAD	  first	  of	  all	  argued	  that	  the	  acceptance	  of	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Tribunal	  did	  not	  extend	  to	  entities	  that	  it	  may	  host	  pursuant	  to	  international	  agreements	  with	  third	  parties;	  secondly,	  it	  observed	  that	  neither	  the	  COP	  nor	  the	  Global	  Mechanism	  had	  recognized	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Tribunal;	  thirdly,	  it	  underlined	  that	  Mrs	  Saez	  García	  was	  not	  a	  staff	  member	  of	  IFAD	  and,	  for	  that	  reason,	  the	  procedures	  concerning	  redundancy	  laid	  down	  in	  the	  Manual	  did	  not	  apply	  to	  her	  mainly	  because	  para.	  11(c)	  of	  IFAD	  President’s	  Bulletin	  No.	  PB/04/01	  of	  21	  January	  2004	  provides	  that	  “IFAD’s	  rules	  and	  regulations	  on	  the	  provision	  of	  career	  contracts	  for	  fixed-­‐term	  staff	  shall	  not	  apply	  to	  staff	  of	  the	  Global	  Mechanism”;	  fourthly,	  it	  submitted	  that	  the	  Fund	  had	  no	  authority	  to	  examine	  whether	  the	  core	  budget	  approved	  by	  the	  UN	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  warranted	  the	  abolition	  of	  the	  complainant’s	  post,	  because	  decisions	  concerning	  the	  employment	   in	  the	  frame	  of	  the	  Global	  Mechanism	  were	  not	  taken	  by	   the	   Fund	   but	   by	   the	   Conference	   itself,	   with	   the	   result	   that	   IFAD	   could	   not	   be	   deemed	  responsible	  for	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  Managing	  Director24.	  	  In	   this	   respect,	   the	   complainant,	   on	   one	   hand,	   declared	   that	   the	   denial	   of	   ILOAT’s	  jurisdiction	  would	  deprive	  her	  of	  any	  legal	  redress	  and,	  on	  the	  other,	  asserted	  that	  she	  was	  a	  staff	  member	  of	  IFAD25.	  The	  Tribunal	  begun	  its	  reasoning	  by	  stating	  that:	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Global	  Mechanism	  is	  an	  integral	   part	   of	   the	   Convention	   and	   is	   accountable	   to	   the	   Conference	   does	   not	   necessarily	  imply	   that	   it	   has	   its	   own	   legal	   identity;	   the	   Global	  Mechanism	   is	   simply	   the	  mechanism	   by	  which	   the	   Conference	   gives	   effect	   to	   certain	   obligations	   created	   by	   the	   Convention;	   the	  statement	   in	   the	  MOU	  of	  November	  1999	   that	   the	  Global	  Mechanism	   is	   to	  have	  a	   “separate	  identity”	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  “it	  has	  a	  separate	  legal	  identity	  or	  […]	  that	  it	  has	  separate	  legal	  personality”.	   In	  this	  context,	   the	  Tribunal,	  by	  recalling	  Section	  II.A	  of	  the	  MOU,	  clarified	  why	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  Global	  Mechanism	  must	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  “organic	  part	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  the	   IFAD”:	   “the	  Managing	   Director	   is	   to	   report	   to	   the	   President	   of	   the	   Fund”;	   the	   chain	   of	  accountability	  runs	  “directly	  from	  the	  Managing	  Director	  to	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Fund	  to	  the	  Conference”;	  “the	  Managing	  Director	  […]	  reports	  to	  the	  Conference	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Fund”;	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Fund	  is	  to	  review	  the	  programme	  of	  work	  and	  the	  budget	  prepared	   by	   the	  Managing	   Director	   of	   the	   Global	  Mechanism	   before	   it	   is	   forwarded	   to	   the	  Executive	   Secretary	   of	   the	   Convention	   for	   consideration”;	   “the	   Global	   Mechanism	   is	   not	  financially	  autonomous”26.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  Tribunal	  emphasized	  that	  the	  sentence	  “an	  organic	  part	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  Fund”	  must	  be	  interpreted	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  Global	  Mechanism	  must	   be	   assimilated	   to	   the	   various	   administrative	   units	   of	   the	   Fund	   for	   all	   administrative	  purposes	   with	   the	   effect	   that	   “administrative	   decisions	   taken	   by	   the	   Managing	   Director	   in	  relation	  to	  staff	  in	  the	  Global	  Mechanism	  are,	  in	  law,	  decisions	  of	  the	  Fund”27.	  Therefore,	  there	  is	  no	  need	   to	  amend	   the	  Convention	  or	   the	  Agreement	  establishing	   IFAD,	  as	  claimed	  by	   the	  latter.	  Moreover,	   there	   is	  no	  doubt,	  according	  to	  the	  Tribunal,	   that	  the	  officials	  of	   the	  Global	  Mechanism	  are	  staff	  members	  of	  the	  Fund28.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 See para. C, p. 6 of the Judgment. 
24 See para. C, pp. 6-7 of the Judgment. 
25 See para. D, pp. 7-8 of the Judgment. 
26 See paras 5-8 of the Judgment. 
27 See para. 7 of the Judgment. 
28 See paras 9-11 of the Judgment. 
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In	  light	  of	  the	  above,	  the	  Tribunal	  held	  that	  IFAD’s	  administrative	  decisions	  on	  the	  staff	  of	  the	  Global	  Mechanism	  were	  subject	  to	  internal	  review	  on	  the	  same	  grounds	  that	  applied	  to	  the	  decisions	   concerning	   other	   staff	  members	   of	   the	   Fund,	   including	   the	   right	   to	   resort	   to	   the	  ILOAT29.	  As	  for	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  case,	  since	  the	  Global	  Mechanism	  functions	  under	  the	  authority	  of	  the	   COP	   and	   the	   Conference	   did	   not	   authorize	   its	   Managing	   Director	   to	   abolish	   the	  complainant’s	  post,	  the	  Tribunal	  concluded	  that	  this	  abolition	  “was	  impliedly	  forbidden	  by	  the	  Conference	  decision”30.	  Accordingly,	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  Managing	  Director	  was	  taken	  without	  authority	  and	  thus	  the	  President	  of	  IFAD	  erred	  in	  law	  in	  not	  so	  finding	  when	  considering	  Mrs	  Saez	   García’s	   internal	   appeal.	   It	   follows	   that	   the	   President’s	   decision	   of	   4	   April	   2008	  dismissing	  the	  complainant’s	  internal	  appeal	  had	  to	  be	  set	  aside31.	  	  3.	   Having	   briefly	   examined	   the	   judgment	   delivered	   by	   the	   ILOAT,	   I	  will	   now	   turn	   to	   the	  Opinion	  of	  the	  ICJ	  concerning	  its	  validity.	  The	  ICJ	  initially	  focused	  on	  the	  matter	  of	   jurisdiction.	  Then,	  it	  considered	  the	  extent	  of	  its	  own	  power	  of	  review.	  Subsequently,	  it	  examined	  the	  scope	  of	  its	  discretion	  and,	  by	  so	  doing,	  dealt	   with	   the	   core	   issue	   at	   stake,	   that	   is,	   the	   nature	   and	   limits	   of	   the	   whole	   procedure	  provided	  for	  by	  Art.	  XII	  of	  the	  ILOAT	  Statute.	  Finally,	  it	  answered	  ten	  questions	  posed	  by	  IFAD	  concerning	   the	   merits	   of	   the	   case32.	   In	   the	   present	   article,	   the	   latter	   issue	   will	   be	   quickly	  examined	  after	  a	  brief	  discussion	  on	  the	  question	  of	  jurisdiction.	  The	  analysis	  will	  be,	  in	  fact,	  devoted	  primarily	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  procedural	  inequality	  before	  the	  ICJ,	  which	  is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  Opinion	  as	  well	  as	  of	  §§	  3.3-­‐5	  of	  this	  essay.	  	  3.1.	  The	  Court	  considered	  whether	  it	  had	  jurisdiction	  to	  reply	  to	  IFAD’s	  request,	  first	  of	  all	  by	  recalling	  that	  Mrs	  Saez	  García	  contended	  that	  some	  of	  the	  questions	  posed	  by	  IFAD	  on	  both	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  ILOAT	  and	  the	  validity	  of	  its	  judgment	  of	  3	  February	  2010	  did	  not	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  Art.	  XII	  of	  the	  Annex	  to	  the	  ILOAT	  Statute.	  The	  Court	  subsequently	  clarified	  that	   certain	   requirements	  must	   be	  met	   if	   an	   opinion	   is	   to	   be	   requested	   and,	   in	   this	   regard,	  maintained	  that,	   in	   light	  of	  those	  requirements,	   IFAD’s	  request	   for	  review	  of	  a	   	   judgment	  by	  the	  ILOAT	  which	  concerned	  the	  hosting	  of	  the	  Global	  Mechanism	  and	  the	  problem	  of	  whether	  Mrs	   Saez	   García	  was	   its	   staff	  member	   “do	   present	   ‘legal	   questions’	  which	   “arise	  within	   the	  scope	  of	  the	  Fund’s	  activities”33.	  	  The	   Court	   then	   emphasized	   that	   the	   authority	   to	   challenge	   decisions	   of	   the	   ILOAT	   by	   a	  request	  for	  an	  advisory	  opinion	  of	  the	  ICJ	  derived	  from	  a	  combination	  of	  Art.	  XII.	  of	  the	  Annex	  to	  the	  ILOAT	  Statute	  with	  Art.	  96.2	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter,	  Art.	  65.1	  of	  the	  ICJ	  Statute	  and	  Art.	  XIII.2	  of	   the	   Relationship	   Agreement	   between	   the	   UN	   and	   IFAD	   (further	   referred	   to	   as	   “the	  Relationship	   Agreement)34.	   In	   particular,	   in	   Art.	   XIII.2	   of	   the	   Relationship	   Agreement	   the	  General	  Assembly	  authorized	  the	  Fund	  to	  request	  advisory	  opinions	  of	  the	  ICJ	  on	  “questions	  arising	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  Fund’s	  activities”.	  It	  is	  thus	  the	  General	  Assembly	  that	  is	  vested	  with	  that	  authority	  and	  not	  the	  ILO	  itself	  –	  which,	  after	  adopting	  the	  ILOAT	  Statute,	  could	  not	  give	   its	   organs	   or	   other	   institutions	   the	   power	   to	   challenge	   judgments	   passed	   by	   the	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33 See paras 21-26 of the Advisory Opinion. 




Tribunal35.	  Accordingly,	  the	  ICJ	  finally	  concluded	  that	  IFAD	  had	  the	  power	  to	  make	  the	  request	  of	   an	   advisory	   opinion	   and,	   therefore,	   that	   the	   Court	   was	   competent	   to	   consider	   that	  request36.	  	  With	   regard	   to	   the	   scope	  of	   the	   ICJ’s	   jurisdiction,	   the	  Court	  made	   clear	   that	   its	  power	   to	  review	  the	  ILOAT’s	  judgment	  on	  Ms	  Saez	  García	  was	  limited	  to	  whether	  the	  Tribunal	  wrongly	  confirmed	   its	   jurisdiction	  or	   the	  decision	  given	  by	   the	   latter	  was	   vitiated	  by	   a	   fundamental	  fault	   in	   the	   procedure	   followed.	   By	   highlighting	   this	   aspect,	   the	   ICJ	   intended	   to	   distinguish	  between	  the	  merits	  and	  jurisdiction,	  as	  done	  in	  the	  Judgments	  of	  the	  Administrative	  Tribunal	  of	  
the	   ILO	   upon	   Complaints	   Made	   against	   Unesco	   of	   October	   1956,	   where	   it	   stated	   that	   “[t]he	  circumstance	  that	  the	  Tribunal	  may	  have	  rightly	  or	  wrongly	  adjudicated	  on	  the	  merits	  or	  that	  it	   may	   have	   rightly	   or	   wrongly	   interpreted	   and	   applied	   the	   law	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	  determining	   the	  merits,	   in	   no	  way	   affects	   its	   jurisdiction”37.	   Therefore	   only	   those	  mistakes	  that	   ILOAT	  may	   make	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   its	   jurisdiction	   could	   be	   detected	   by	   the	   Court	   through	   its	  advisory	  opinion,	  while	  errors	  of	  fact	  or	  of	  law	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Administrative	  Tribunal	  on	  the	  merits	   cannot	   give	   rise	   to	   the	   procedure	   envisaged	   under	   Art.	   XII	   of	   the	   Annex	   to	   the	  ILOAT	  Statute.	  As	  already	  stated	  by	  the	  Court	   in	   Judgments	  of	   the	  Administrative	  Tribunal	  of	  
the	  ILO	  upon	  Complaints	  Made	  against	  Unesco,	  the	  review	  “is	  not	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  an	  appeal	  on	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  judgment”38.	  As	  far	  as	  the	  meaning	  of	  “fundamental	  fault	  in	  the	  procedure	  followed”	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  second	  ground	   for	   challenge	   –	   is	   concerned,	   the	   ICJ	   observed	   that	   “[a]n	   error	   in	   procedure	   is	  fundamental	   and	   constitutes	   ‘a	   failure	   of	   justice’	  when	   it	   is	   of	   such	   a	   kind	   as	   to	   violate	   the	  official’s	  right	  to	  a	  fair	  hearing”	  and	  in	  that	  sense	  to	  deprive	  him/her	  of	  justice39.	  3.2.	  In	  order	  to	  answer	  the	  first	  question	  posed	  by	  IFAD	  regarding	  the	  competence	  of	  the	  ILOAT	  to	  hear	  the	  complaint	  brought	  against	  the	  Fund	  by	  Mrs	  Saez	  García	  in	  accordance	  with	  Art.	   5	   of	   its	   Statute,	   the	   Court	   had	   to	   decide,	   as	   already	   done	   by	   the	  Tribunal,	  whether	   the	  following	  two	  conditions	  foreseen	  in	  that	  provision	  were	  fulfilled:	  firstly,	  the	  complaint	  should	  be	  brought	  by	  an	  official	  of	  an	  organization	  that	  has	  recognized	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Tribunal	  and,	   secondly,	   it	   should	   relate	   to	   the	   non-­‐observance	   of	   the	   terms	   of	   appointment	   for	   that	  official	  and/or	  of	  the	  Staff	  Regulations	  of	  the	  organization.	  The	  two	  conditions	  pertain	  to	  the	  competence,	  respectively,	  ratione	  personae	  and	  ratione	  materiae	  of	  the	  Tribunal40.	  As	   to	   the	   first	  condition,	   the	  problem	  is	  whether	  Mrs	  Saez	  García	  was	   to	  be	  considered	  a	  staff	  member	  of	  the	  Global	  Mechanism,	  that	  is,	  of	  an	  entity	  which	  has	  not	  recognized	  ILOAT’s	  jurisdiction,	   as	   contended	   by	   IFAD,	   or	   an	   official	   of	   the	   Fund,	   as	   maintained	   by	   Mrs	   Saez	  García.	  The	   Court	   clarified	   that	   the	   problem	   revolved	   around	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   relationship	  between	  the	  UNCCD,	  namely	  the	  COP,	  IFAD	  and	  the	  Global	  Mechanism.	  In	  this	  connection,	   it	  observed	   that	  neither	   the	  Convention	  nor	   the	  MOU	  between	   the	  COP	  and	   IFAD	  confer	   legal	  personality	  on	  the	  Global	  Mechanism	  or	  otherwise	  accord	  to	  it	  the	  competence	  to	  enter	  into	  legal	   arrangements41.	   Furthermore,	   according	   to	   the	   Court,	   the	   Global	   Mechanism	   had	   no	  power	   to	   enter	   into	   contracts,	   agreements	   or	   ‘arrangements’,	   at	   both	   international	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See paras 25-26 of the Advisory Opinion. 
36 See para. 27 of the Advisory Opinion. 
37 See para. 29 of the Advisory Opinion. 
38 On the notion of “appeal” see infra, § 5.  
39 See paras 30-32 of the Advisory Opinion. 
40 See para. 68 of the Advisory Opinion. 
41 See para. 61 of the Advisory Opinion. 
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national	  level.	  This	  means	  that	  Mrs.	  Saez	  García	  was	  right	  when	  she	  argued	  that	  the	  Managing	  Director	  of	  the	  Global	  Mechanism	  is	  an	  officer	  of	  the	  Fund	  and	  that	  his	  actions	  are,	  in	  law,	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Fund42.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  above,	  the	  Court,	  by	  noting	  that	  an	  employment	  relationship	  was	  established	  between	   Mrs	   Saez	   García	   and	   the	   Fund	   and	   that	   this	   relationship	   qualified	   her	   as	   a	   staff	  member	  of	  the	  Fund,	  concluded	  that	  the	  Tribunal	  was	  competent	  ratione	  personae	  to	  consider	  the	  complaint	  filed	  by	  Ms	  Saez	  García	  against	  IFAD43.	  	  As	   for	   the	  second	  condition,	   the	  problem	   is	  whether	  Mrs	  Saez	  García’s	  complaint	  may	  be	  included,	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	   terms	   of	   Art.	   II.5	   of	   ILOAT	   Statute,	   among	   the	   complaints	  alleging	   non-­‐observance,	   in	   substance	   or	   form,	   of	   the	   terms	   of	   appointment	   of	   officials	   or	  those	  alleging	  non-­‐observance	  of	  provisions	  of	  the	  Staff	  Regulations.	  The	  Court,	  by	  stressing	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Managing	  Director	  of	  the	  Global	  Mechanism	  was	  a	  staff	  member	  of	  the	  Fund	  when	  the	  decision	  of	  non-­‐renewal	  of	  Ms	  Saez	  García’s	  contract	  was	  taken,	  upheld	  the	  official’s	  argument	  according	   to	  which	   the	  Tribunal	  was	  competent	   to	  hear	  claims	   that	  challenge	   the	  international	  organization’s	  decisions	  due	  to	   the	  consideration	  that	   they	  would	  be	  based	  on	  wrong	   reasons	   or	   vitiated	   by	   substantive	   or	   procedural	   flaws.	   In	   both	   cases,	   in	   fact,	   the	  allegations	  would	  fit	  within	  those	  covered	  by	  Art.	  II.5	  of	  the	  ILOAT	  Statute44.	  As	   a	   consequence,	   the	   Court	   held	   that	   the	   Tribunal	   was	   competent	   ratione	   personae	  because	  Ms	  Saez	  García	  was	  a	  staff	  member	  of	  the	  Fund	  and	  also	  ratione	  materiae	  because	  her	  appointment	   was	   governed	   by	   IFAD’s	   provisions	   on	   the	   terms	   of	   appointment	   of	   its	   staff	  members.	  Acknowledging	   that	   the	   ILOAT	   had	   jurisdiction,	   the	   Court	   made	   it	   clear	   that	   it	   had	  answered	  not	  only	  the	  first	  question,	  but	  all	  the	  issues	  regarding	  the	  question	  of	  jurisdiction	  raised	  by	  the	  Fund	  in	  its	  other	  seven	  questions45.	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  remaining	  claim	  brought	  by	  IFAD	  concerning	  a	  “fundamental	  fault	  in	  the	  procedure”	  that	  may	  has	  been	  committed	  by	  ILOAT,	  the	  Court	  limited	  itself	  to	  consider	  that	  no	  fault	  had	  been	  identified46.	  On	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   reasoning	   briefly	   described	   above,	   the	   Court	   responded	   to	   the	   last	  question	  posed	  by	  IFAD	  and	  found	  “that	  the	  decision	  given	  by	  the	  ILOAT	  in	  its	  judgment	  No.	  2867	  is	  valid”47.	  3.3.	  The	  recent	  Advisory	  Opinion	  rendered	  by	  the	  Court	  was	  the	  occasion	  for	  it	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  extent	  and	  limits	  of	  the	  application	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  equality	  before	  the	  ICJ,	  with	  regard	  to	   the	   status	   of	   international	   organizations	   on	   one	   hand	   and	   of	   their	   staff	  members	   on	   the	  other.	  The	  issue	  was	  already	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  context	  of	  previous	  requests	  brought	  to	  the	  Court	  by	  way	  of	  applications	  for	  review	  of	  judgments	  of	  both	  the	  UNAT	  and	  ILOAT48,	  in	  which	  the	  ICJ	  had	   affirmed,	   inter	   alia,	   that	   not	   responding	   to	   the	   request	   for	   an	   advisory	   opinion	  would	  endanger	   the	   functioning	   of	   the	   regime	   established	   by	   the	   ILOAT	   Statute	   for	   the	   judicial	  protection	  of	  officials49.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 See paras 87-88 of the Advisory Opinion. 
43 See paras 71-82 of the Advisory Opinion. 
44 See paras 83-95 of the Advisory Opinion. 
45 See paras 96-97 of the Advisory Opinion. 
46 See para. 98 of the Advisory Opinion. 
47 See para. 99 of the Advisory Opinion. 
48 See especially Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon Complaints Made against Unesco, p. 85; 
see also the opinions mentioned supra, footnotes 8 and 14, and also Consistency of Certain Danzig Legislative Decrees 
with the Constitution of the Free City of 4 December 1935, Series 1935, 40. 
49 See para. 36 of the Advisory Opinion and Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon Complaints 
Made against Unesco, p. 86.  
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The	  concerns	  relate	  to	  two	  sides	  of	  the	  same	  coin,	  which	  is	  represented	  by	  the	  principle	  of	  equality:	  the	  notion	  of	  jus	  standi	  and	  jus	  locus	  standi	  in	  judicio,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  (in)equality	  in	  the	  access	  to	  the	  Court	  and	  the	  (in)equalities	  in	  the	  proceedings	  before	  it.	  The	  crucial	  problem	  is	   that	   it	   is	   only	   the	   organization	   that	   is	   entitled	   to	   request	   an	   opinion	   of	   the	   ICJ	   and	   to	  participate	  in	  the	  proceedings	  before	  it.	  As	   far	   as	   jus	   standi	   is	   concerned,	   the	  Court	  begun	   its	   reasoning	  by	  making	  a	   comparison	  between	   the	   former	  UN	   system	  of	   administration	   of	   justice,	   in	   force	   from	  1955	   to	   1995	   as	  already	   noted	   above50,	   and	   the	   one	   established	   by	   the	   Annex	   to	   Art.	   XII.1	   of	   the	   ILOAT	  Statute51.	  In	  fact,	  Art.	  11.1-­‐4	  of	  the	  former	  UNAT	  Statute52	  allowed	  staff	  members,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  employer,	  the	  Secretary	  General	  and	  Member	  States	  of	  the	  UN,	  to	  object	  to	  the	  Tribunal’s	  judgment	  and	  “make	  a	  written	  application”	  to	  a	  Committee	  composed	  of	  “the	  Member	  States	  the	   representatives	   of	   which	   have	   served	   on	   the	   General	   Committee	   of	   the	   most	   recent	  regular	   session	   of	   the	   General	   Assembly”,	   so	   that	   the	   Committee	  may	   request	   an	   advisory	  opinion	   of	   the	   ICJ	   on	   the	  matter.	   This	  means	   that	   even	   though	   the	   official,	   given	   the	  well-­‐known	  limits	  ratione	  personae	  concerning	  the	  scope	  of	  Art.	  96	  of	  the	  ICJ	  Statute	  –	  that	  permits	  only	  to	  the	  General	  Assembly,	  the	  Security	  Council	  and	  other	  organs	  of	  the	  UN	  and	  specialized	  agencies	   (so	   authorized	   by	   the	   General	   Assembly)	   to	   request	   the	   opinion	   –,	   had	   no	   direct	  power	   for	   resorting	   to	   the	   Court,	   there	  was	   a	  way	   for	   him/her	   to	   initiate	   the	   procedure	   of	  request	  to	  the	  ICJ,	  unlike	  the	  system	  established	  by	  the	  ILOAT	  Statute.	  	  The	  Court	  then	  focused	  on	  the	  developments	  occurred	  at	  international	  level	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  right	  of	  access	  to	  justice	  and	  did	  so	  by	  recalling	  two	  comments,	  adopted	  in	  1984	  and	  2007	  by	   the	  UN	  Human	  Rights	  Committee,	  on	  Art	  14.1	  of	   the	   International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights	  of	  19	  December	  1966,	  which	  requires	  that	  “[a]ll	  persons	  shall	  be	  equal	  before	  the	  courts	  and	  tribunals”.	  In	  particular,	  in	  the	  second	  comment	  it	  is	  stated	  that	  “if	  procedural	  rights	  are	  accorded	  they	  must	  be	  provided	  to	  all	  the	  parties	  unless	  distinctions	  can	  be	  justified	  on	  objective	  and	  reasonable	  grounds”.	  	  Further,	   the	   ICJ	   responded	   to	   IFAD’s	   statement	   that	   the	   request	   for	   an	   advisory	   opinion	  pertained	  “not	  to	  any	  dispute	  between	  the	  Fund	  and	  Ms	  Saez	  García,	  but	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Fund	  and	  the	  ILO	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  ILOAT,	  a	  subsidiary	  body	  of	  the	  ILO”.	  In	  the	  Court’s	  opinion,	   the	  “real”	  dispute	  was	  between	  Mrs	  Saez	  García	  and	  the	  Fund,	  not	  between	  the	  Fund	  and	  the	  ILO.	  Plus,	  the	  Court	  clarified	  that	  IFAD	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  bring	  a	  matter	  about	   its	   relationship	   with	   the	   ILO	   before	   the	   Court,	   since	   the	   General	   Assembly,	   when	  authorizing	   IFAD	   to	   seek	   advisory	   opinions,	   under	   Art	   96.2	   of	   the	   UN	   Charter,	   expressly	  excluded	   questions	   concerning	   the	   mutual	   relationships	   of	   the	   Fund	   and	   the	   UN	   or	   other	  specialized	  agencies53.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  Court	  was	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  the	  argument	  submitted	  by	  IFAD	  –	  according	  to	  which	  the	  procedure	  set	  out	  in	  Art.	  XII	  of	  the	  Annex	  to	  the	  ILOAT	  Statute	  seemed	  to	  have	  many	  features	   in	  common	  with	   investor-­‐State	  arbitration	  –	  was	  not	  well	   founded.	   IFAD	  had	  observed,	   first	   of	   all,	   that	   in	   such	   arbitrations	   it	   is	   only	   the	   investor	   that	   may	   initiate	   the	  dispute	  settlement	  process,	  and,	  secondly,	  with	  regard	  to	  bilateral	  free	  trade	  and	  investment	  treaties,	  that	  they	  contain	  clauses	  enabling	  the	  State	  parties	  to	  declare,	  by	  joint	  decision,	  at	  the	  request	   of	   one	   of	   them,	   their	   interpretation,	   which	   is	   binding	   on	   the	   tribunal	   hearing	   an	  investment	   dispute	   including	   those	   brought	   by	   the	   investor.	   In	   this	   connection,	   the	   Court	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 See supra, footnote 10. 
51 See para. 36 of the Advisory Opinion. 
52 It is interesting to clarify that between 1995 and 2009 the UN system contained no provision at all on the review of 
the decisions of the UNAT. 
53 See para. 42 of the Advisory Opinion. 
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made	  clear	  that	  those	  situations	  bear	  little	  resemblance	  to	  the	  procedure	  set	  out	  in	  Art.	  XII	  of	  the	  Annex	  to	  the	  ILOAT	  Statute.	  In	  fact,	  while	  “parties	  to	  treaties	  are	  in	  general	  free	  to	  agree	  on	   their	   interpretation”,	   in	   the	  present	   case	   “the	  Court	   is	   concerned	  with	   the	   initiation	  of	   a	  review	  process	  to	  be	  carried	  out	  by	  an	  independent	  tribunal”54.	  	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  ICJ	  acknowledged,	  as	  already	  done	  in	  its	  advisory	  opinion	  of	  195655,	  that	  there	  is	  a	  concern	  about	  the	  inequality	  of	  access	  to	  the	  Court	  arising	  from	  the	  combination	  of	  Art.	   XII	   of	   the	  Annex	   to	   the	   ILOAT	   Statute,	   Art.	   65	   of	   the	   ICJ	   Statute	   and	  Art.	   96	   of	   the	  UN	  Charter.	  It	  is	  the	  system	  established	  in	  1946	  by	  the	  UN,	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  review	  of	  ILOAT’s	  decisions,	  to	  be	  put	  (at	  least	  partially)	  in	  question	  by	  the	  Court56.	  Therefore	  the	  ICJ	  seems	  to	  implicitly	   have	   said	   that	   this	   system	   is	   not	   in	   line	   neither	   with	   the	   law	   governing	   the	   UN	  system	   of	   administration	   of	   justice	   now	   in	   force	   nor	   with	   the	   current	   developments	   of	  international	   law	   aimed	   at	   fostering	   the	   individuals’	   right	   of	   access	   to	   justice	   before	  international	  and	  supranational	  jurisdictions57.	  This	  is	  clear	  also	  when	  the	  Court	  noted	  that,	  in	  the	   case	   of	   the	   ILOAT,	   there	   wasn’t	   any	   justification	   for	   the	   provision	   for	   review	   of	   the	  Tribunal’s	  decisions	  which	  favors	  the	  employer	  to	  the	  disadvantage	  of	  the	  staff	  member58.	  The	   ICJ	   clarified	   that	   it	   cannot	   reform	   the	   system	   as	   it	   stands	   for	   what	   concerns	   the	  (in)equality	  of	  access,	  i.e.	  the	  jus	  standi,	  since,	  as	  known,	  for	  amendments	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter	  it	  must	  be	  followed	  the	  procedure	  set	  out	  in	  its	  Chapter	  XVIII.	  This	  is	  why	  the	  Court	  decided	  to	  dwell	   upon	   the	   (strongly	   connected)	   issue	   of	   the	   jus	   locus	   standi	   in	   judicio,	   that	   is	   of	   the	  (in)equality	   of	   arms	   in	   the	   proceedings	   before	   it.	   This	   way	   the	   Court	   tried	   to	   balance	   the	  problems	  arising	  from	  the	  inequality	  of	  access	  by	  diminishing	  the	  unequal	  position	  before	  the	  Court	  of	  the	  employing	  institution	  and	  its	  official.	  To	  this	  end	  the	  ICJ	  determined:	  not	  to	  admit	  oral	   proceedings,	   since,	   as	   known,	   the	   Court’s	   Statute	   does	   allows	   only	   the	   international	  organization	   concerned	   –	   not	   the	   individual	   –	   to	   appear	   before	   the	   Court59;	   to	   oblige	   the	  President	  of	  IFAD	  to	  transmit	  to	  the	  Court	  any	  statement	  Mrs	  Saez	  García	  intends	  to	  convey	  to	  the	  latter;	  to	  fix	  the	  same	  time-­‐limits	  for	  the	  filing	  of	  the	  two	  parties’	  written	  statements60.	  	  In	  the	  last	  part	  of	  the	  opinion	  concerning	  the	  extent	  and	  limits	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  equality,	  the	   Court	   noted	   that,	   notwithstanding	   its	   approach	   aimed	   at	   giving	   more	   attention	   to	   the	  official’s	   prerogatives,	   there	   have	   been	   several	   difficulties	   throughout	   the	   proceedings61.	  However,	   these	   difficulties	   were	   not	   decisive	   as,	   by	   the	   end	   of	   the	   process,	   it	   had	   all	  information	  it	  required	  to	  decide	  upon	  the	  request	  filed	  by	  IFAD:	  “in	  essence,	  the	  principle	  of	  equality	  in	  the	  proceedings	  before	  the	  Court,	  required	  by	  its	  inherent	  judicial	  character	  and	  by	  the	  good	  administration	  of	  justice,	  has	  been	  met”62.	  3.4.	   Judge	   Cançado	   Trinidade	   appended	   a	   very	   long,	   accurate	   separate	   opinion	   to	   the	  advisory	  opinion	  of	   the	   ICJ,	  which	  deserves	   close	  attention63.	  The	   Judge’s	  main	  argument	   is	  that	  cases	  such	  at	  the	  one	  at	  stake	  show	  the	  urgent	  need	  for	  a	  “reconsideration”	  of	  the	  whole	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 See para. 43 of the Advisory Opinion. 
55 See Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon Complaints Made against Unesco, p. 85. 
56 See para. 44 of the Advisory Opinion. 
57 On this topic see the analysis of Judge Cançado Trinidade’s separate opinion carried out infra, § 3.4. 
58 See para. 44 of the Advisory Opinion. 
59 On this aspect see also Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 
para. 34. 
60 See para. 45 of the Advisory Opinion.  
61 On this point see infra, § 4. 
62 See paras 46-48 of the Advisory Opinion. 
63 ICJ Reports 2012, 51; see also the declaration appended by Judge Greenwood (ICJ Reports 2012, 94). 
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procedure	   concerning	   the	   review	   of	   the	   ILOAT’s	   judgments	   by	   the	   ICJ64.	   The	   meaning	   of	  “reconsideration”	   is	   not	   clarified	   by	   Cançado	   Trinidade,	   who	   observes	   as	   well	   that	   “[l]egal	  instruments,	  whichever	  their	  hierarchy,	  are	  a	  product	  of	  their	  time,	  and	  I	  am	  sure	  that	  we	  all	  agree	  as	  to	  the	  need	  to	  work	  for	  the	  realization	  of	  justice	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  challenges	  of	  our	  time,	  so	  as	  to	  respond	  properly	  to	  them”65.	  It	  is	  reasonable	  to	  think	  that	  Cançado	  Trinidade	  is	  asking	   for	   an	   amendment	   of	   the	   ILOAT	   Statute,	   the	  UN	  Charter	   and	   the	   ICJ	   Statute66	   since,	  quite	  clearly,	  a	  “simple”	  (re)interpretation	  of	  the	  relevant	  provisions	  would	  not	  be	  enough.	  The	  aim	  of	   this	  radical	  changeover	  of	  perspective	  would	  be	   to	  grant	   individuals,	   like	  Mrs	  Saez	  García,	  the	  right	  to	  request	  an	  advisory	  opinion	  (jus	  standi)	  and	  participate	  as	  a	  party	  at	  the	   proceedings	   which	   take	   place	   before	   the	   ICJ	   (jus	   locus	   standi	   in	   judicio).	   According	   to	  Cançado	  Trinidade,	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  inequality	  of	  the	  parties	  in	  review	  procedures	  before	  the	   ICJ	  was	   already	   raised	  by	   several	   judges	   of	   the	   ICJ67	   in	   their	   declarations,	   separate	   and	  dissenting	   opinions,	   starting	   with	   the	   dissenting	   opinion	   of	   1956	   appended	   by	   Judge	  Córdova68	  to	  the	  Court’s	  advisory	  opinion	  on	  Judgments	  of	  the	  Administrative	  Tribunal	  of	  the	  
ILO	   upon	   Complaints	   Made	   against	   Unesco69.	   Cançado	   Trinidade	   conducted	   a	   resolute	  criticism.	  He	  noted,	  inter	  alia,	  that	  “[f]or	  56	  years	  the	  force	  of	  inertia	  and	  mental	  lethargy	  have	  prevailed”70,	  since	  the	  ICJ	  is	  still	  deferent	  to	  the	  dogma	  that	  individuals	  cannot	  appear	  before	  the	  Court	  because	  they	  are	  not	  subjects	  of	  international	  law.	  In	  Cançado	  Trinidade’s	  opinion,	  the	   procedure	   set	   out	   in	   Art.	   XII	   of	   the	   ILOAT	   Statute,	   combined	   with	   the	   prohibition	   for	  individuals	  to	  appear	  before	  the	  ICJ,	  is	  “prehistoric	  and	  fossilized”	  and	  “defies	  logic,	  common	  sense	  and	  the	  basic	  principle	  of	  the	  good	  administration	  of	  justice”71.	  At	  the	  core	  of	  Cançado	  Trinidade’s	  opinion	  lies	  the	  consideration	  that	  “the	  emergence	  and	  consolidation	  of	  individuals	  as	  subjects	  of	  International	  Law”72	  solicit	  the	  ICJ	  –	  as	  well	  as	  the	  legal	   scholarship	   –	   to	   secure	   the	   right	   of	   access	   to	   justice	   of	   international	   organizations’	  officials	   before	   international	   tribunals,	   including	   the	   ICJ.	   Cançado	   Trinidade’s	   reasoning	   is	  grounded	  on	  the	  theories	  of	  a	  number	  of	  philosophers	  and	  jurists	  who	  have	  emphasized,	  over	  the	  centuries,	  the	  role	  of	  human	  beings	  within	  the	  societas	  gentium	  by	  stressing	  that	  the	  law	  governs	  not	  only	  the	  relationships	  between	  States	  but	  above	  all	  the	  relationships	  amongst	  all	  members	  of	  the	  “universal	  society”73.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 The term “reconsideration” is used in para. 81 of the Separate Opinion. 
65 See para. 118 of the Separate Opinion. 
66 L. Gross, “Participation of Individuals in Advisory Proceedings before the International Court of Justice: Question of 
Equality between the Parties”, American Journal of International Law 52 (1958): 40, had already suggested the 
insertion of an additional chapter in the UN Charter. 
67 In addition to the judges’ scientific essays, as it is the case of Shabtai Rosenne, “Reflections on the Position of the 
Individual in Inter-State Litigation in the International Court of Justice”, in International Arbitration ⎯ Liber Amicorum 
for M. Domke, ed. Pieter Sanders (Kluwer: The Hague, 1967), 242 and 249, cited by Cançado Trinidade at para. 81 of 
the Separate Opinion. 
68 ICJ Reports 1956, 155. 
69 Like M. Zafrulla Khan, R. Córdova, F. de Castro, P. Morozov, A. Gros, H. Mosler, R. Ago; on this point see 
especially paras 37-42, 44, 46, 50, of the Separate Opinion.  
70 See para. 48 of the Separate Opinion.  
71 Ibidem. 
72 See paras 51 and 56 of the Separate Opinion. 
73 See paras 58-63 of the Separate Opinion, where Cançado Trinidade recalled “the illuminating thoughts and vision of 
the so-called founding fathers of International Law” (para. 62) such as Franciso de Vitoria, Alberico Gentili, Hugo 
Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, Christian Wolff,  Bynkershoek, Hegel. 
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Cançado	   Trinidade	   then	   noted	   that	   at	   regional	   level	   the	   direct	   access	   to	   international	  tribunals	   is	  extensively	  granted	  not	  only	  to	  States	  but	  also	  to	   individuals.	  This	   is	   the	  case	  of	  the	   Central	   American	   Court	   of	   Justice,	   the	   European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights,	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  the	  African	  Court	  of	  Human	  and	  Peoples’	  Rights74.	  	  The	   above	   considerations	   led	   Cançado	   Trinidade	   to	   highlight	   that	   many	   cases	   brought	  before	   the	   ICJ	   pertained	   to	   the	   condition	   of	   individuals	   whose	   presence	   before	   the	   Court	  would	  have	  enriched	  the	  proceedings	  and	  facilitated	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Court.	  He	  subsequently	  concluded,	   as	   to	   the	   case	   of	   Mrs	   Saez	   García,	   that,	   “keeping	   […]	   dogmatisms	   apart,	   it	   can	  hardly	  be	  denied	  that	  there	  should	  have	  been	  a	  hearing”,	  with	  the	  presence	  of	  both	  the	  legal	  representative	  of	  the	  IFAD	  and	  its	  official’s75.	  	  As	  it	  will	  be	  clarified	  in	  the	  following	  §§,	  Cançado	  Trinidade’s	  theory	  is	  embraceable	  in	  that	  he	   calls	   into	   question	   the	   procedure	   envisaged	   under	   Art.	   XII	   of	   the	   Annex	   to	   the	   ILOAT	  Statute	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  does	  not	  secure	  to	  the	  official	  involved	  in	  a	  dispute	  against	  the	  organization	   neither	   the	   right	   to	   initiate	   the	   proceedings	   before	   the	   ICJ	   nor	   the	   right	   to	  participate	  as	  a	  party.	   It	   is	   true	   that	  such	  procedure	  seems	  to	   infringe	   the	  right	  of	  access	   to	  justice	   lato	   sensu,	   that	   is	   the	   right	   to	   a	   fair	   trial,	   with	   its	   corollaries,	   amongst	   which	   the	  principle	  of	  equality	  of	  arms,	  the	  principles	  of	  good	  administration	  of	  justice	  and	  the	  principe	  
du	  contradictoire.	  It	  is	  also	  true	  that	  international	  law	  as	  it	  stands	  grants	  a	  great	  protection	  to	  individuals	  who	  seek	  to	  vindicate	  their	  rights	  before	  national	  and	  international	  tribunals.	  	  However,	   two	  main	   arguments	  made	   by	   Cançado	  Trinidade	   cannot	   be	   sustained.	   Firstly,	  according	   to	   Cançado	  Trinidade,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	   fact	  ex	   se	   that	   individuals	   are	   entitled	   to	  exercise	   rights	   towards	   sovereign	   States,	   at	   national,	   regional	   and	   also	   international	   levels,	  implies	  automatically	  that	  they	  are	  always	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  having	  international	   juridical	  personality.	  Although	  the	  aim	  of	  this	  article	  is	  clearly	  not	  to	  confront	  with	  such	  issue,	  what	  I	  maintain	  here	  is	  that	  the	  argument	  raised	  by	  Cançado	  Trinidade	  tends	  to	  simplify	  too	  much	  in	  that	  it	  seems	  to	  provide	  a	  solution	  that	  cannot	  be	  valid	  for	  all	  legal	  contexts	  and	  scenarios.	  In	  this	  connection,	  the	  obstacle	  for	  granting	  to	  international	  organizations’	  staff	  members	  a	  full	  right	  of	  access	  to	  justice	  is	  represented	  above	  all	  by	  the	  UN	  legal	  order	  and	  the	  ILOAT	  Statute	  rather	  than	  by	  mental	  inertia	  and	  lethargy.	  Secondly	  (and	  most	  importantly),	  unlike	  Cançado	  Trinidade,	   I	   believe	   that	   the	   ICJ’s	   competence	   ex	   se	   to	   give	   advisory	   opinion	   on	   disputes	  between	  international	  organizations	  and	  their	  staff	  system	  is	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  evolving	  status	  of	  the	  right	  of	  access	  to	  justice	  under	  international	  law	  and	  the	  law	  of	  the	  international	  civil	  service.	   The	   crucial	   question,	   therefore,	   is	   not	   whether	   international	   officials,	   like	   other	  categories	   of	   individuals,	   are	   to	   be	   considered	   as	   subjects	   of	   international	   law.	   On	   the	  contrary,	  scholars	  should	  consider	  whether	  the	  ICJ	  is	  the	  most	  appropriate	  forum	  to	  settle	  this	  kind	  of	  controversies.	  4.	   As	   it	   has	   been	   shown76,	   the	   ICJ	   formulated	   a	   number	   of	   legal	   remedies	   to	   face	   the	  problem	  arising	  from	  the	  lack	  of	  jus	  standi	  upon	  Mrs	  Saez	  García.	  The	  solution	  chosen	  by	  the	  Court	  was	  to	  secure	  more	  equality	  between	  IFAD	  and	  its	  official	  in	  the	  proceedings	  before	  it	  (jus	  locus	  standi	  in	  judicio).	  The	  Court	  decided	  not	  to	  hold	  oral	  hearings	  and	  to	  allow	  Mrs	  Saez	  García	  to	  transmit	  to	  the	  Court,	  through	  the	  President	  of	  IFAD,	  any	  written	  statement	  which	  she	  might	  wish	   to	  bring	   to	   the	   attention	  of	   the	   Judges.	   Furthermore,	   the	   ICJ	   fixed	   the	   same	  time-­‐limits	   for	  Mrs	  Saez	  García	  as	   for	   IFAD	   for	   the	   filing	  of	   statements	   in	   the	   first	   round	  as	  well	  as	  of	  comments	  to	  the	  counterpart’s	  arguments	  in	  the	  second	  round.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 See paras 64-68 of the Separate Opinion. 
75 See paras. 78-109 of the Separate Opinion. 
76 See supra, § 3.3. 
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Although	  the	  above	  measures	  reduced	  inequality	  between	  the	  parties,	  the	  Court	  clearly	  did	  not	  re-­‐establish	  equality	  of	  arms	  between	  them.	  As	  to	  the	  choice	  not	  to	  hold	  oral	  hearings,	  I	  do	  not	  agree	  with	  the	  criticism,	  made	  by	  Cançado	  Trinidade	  in	  his	  separate	  opinion77,	  according	  to	  which	  by	  this	  solution	  the	  Court	  would	  have	  deprived	  itself	  to	  instruct	  better	  the	  dossier	  of	  the	  case,	  with	  the	  result	  to	  impose,	  ex	  ante,	  a	  limit	  to	  the	  freedom	  of	  expression	  of	  the	  actors	  concerned.	   In	   fact,	   as	   it	   happens	   in	   other	   jurisdictional	   systems	  where	   cases	   are	   generally	  settled	  through	  written	  proceedings78,	  the	  fairness	  of	  a	  trial	  is	  not	  necessarily	  associated	  with	  the	  oral	  character	  of	  the	  procedure.	  The	  problem	  concerning	  the	  proceedings	  before	  the	  ICJ	  is	  the	   impossibility	   for	   the	   official	   to	   interact	   with	   the	   Court	   autonomously,	   i.e.	   without	  necessarily	  passing	  through	  the	  pseudo-­‐gatekeeper	  function	  exercised	  by	  the	  organization.	  For	  what	  concerns	  the	  obligation	   imposed	  upon	  IFAD	  to	  receive	  any	  statements	  made	  by	  Mrs	  Saez	  García	  and	  to	  transmit	  it	  to	  the	  Court,	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  valid	  alternative	  to	  be	  applied	   in	   the	   present	   situation	   as	   well	   as	   pro	   futuro	   in	   other	   cases	   by	   the	   ICJ.	   This	   is	  demonstrated	  by	  a	  number	  of	  circumstances	  and	  difficulties	  occurred	  during	  the	  proceedings.	  First	  of	  all,	  IFAD’s	  choice	  to	  request	  an	  advisory	  opinion	  has	  been	  used	  as	  an	  escamotage	  for	  not	   executing	   Judgment	  No.	   2867	  of	   ILOAT	   inasmuch	   as	   the	   Fund	  maintained	   that	   it	  might	  become	   entitled	   to	   repayment	   of	   the	   amounts	   due	   if	   the	   Court	   would	   declare	   the	   ILOAT’s	  decision	  invalid.	  Secondly,	  the	  filing	  of	  “all	  documents	  likely	  to	  throw	  light	  upon	  the	  question”	  pursuant	  to	  Art.	  65.2	  of	  the	  ICJ	  Statute	  was	  completed	  only	  after	  more	  than	  15	  months	  from	  the	  submission	  of	  the	  request	  by	  IFAD.	  Thirdly,	  IFAD	  failed	  several	  times,	  as	  indicated	  by	  the	  Court,	  to	  inform	  Mrs	  Saez	  García	  in	  a	  timely	  way	  of	  the	  documents	  it	  was	  transmitting	  to	  the	  Court.	   Fourthly,	   IFAD	   did	   not	   transmit	   to	   the	   Court	   certain	   communications	   that	  Mrs	   Saez	  García	  wished	  to	  submit	  to	  the	  ICJ.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  the	  Fund’s	  behavior	  prompted	  the	  Registry	  of	  the	  Court	   to	   intervene	   in	  order	   to	  ensure	   that	  Mrs	  Saez	  García’s	  statements	  would	  be	   taken	  into	  due	  consideration79.	  However,	  the	  issue	  is	  not	  whether	  the	  ICJ,	  in	  this	  case,	  has	  done	  its	  best	   to	   reduce	   the	   disparities	   between	  Mrs	   Saez	   García	   and	   IFAD,	   so	   that	   the	   former	  may	  receive	  a	   fair	  hearing.	  The	  Court’s	  activism	   is	  not,	   in	   itself,	  a	  remedy	  able	  to	  conceal	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  official’s	  interests	  will	  be	  defended	  and	  represented	  depending	  on	  the	  willingness	  of	  the	  organizations	  to	  do	  so.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  IFAD’s	  attitude	  will	  be	  taken	  also	  by	  other	  organizations	  in	  the	  case	  of	  new	  requests	  for	  an	  advisory	  opinion	  which	  challenge	  a	  decision	  taken	  by	  the	  ILOAT.	  	  The	  circumstances	  described	  above	  must	  be	  read	  in	  light	  of	  two	  more	  features	  that	  define	  the	  procedure	  envisaged	  under	  the	  ILOAT	  Statute,	  and	  which	  differentiate	  it	  from	  other	  types	  of	  requests	  for	  advisory	  opinions	  made	  by	  the	  General	  Assembly80	  in	  cases	  such	  as	  Accordance	  
with	  International	  Law	  of	  the	  Unilateral	  Declaration	  of	  Independence	  in	  respect	  of	  Kosovo	  of	  22	  July	  201081.	  	  The	  first	  distinctive	  element	  of	  the	  advisory	  opinions	  of	  the	  ICJ	  regarding	  staff	  disputes	  in	  the	  frame	  of	  Art.	  XII	  of	  the	  ILOAT	  Statute	  is	  that	  such	  opinions,	  in	  accordance	  with	  Art.	  XII.2,	  are	   binding,	   even	   though	   formally	   defined	   as	   “advisory”	   under	   Art.	   65.1	   of	   the	   Court’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 See para. 52 of the Separate Opinion. 
78 One example is represented by the European Court of Human Rights. 
79 See para. 46 of the Advisory Opinion. 
80 On the advisory function of the ICJ more in general see the observations made, amongst others, by Benedetto 
Conforti and Carlo Focarelli, The Law and Practice of the United Nations (4th edn. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
2010), 382-292; Sergio Marchisio, L’ONU: il diritto delle Nazioni Unite (2nd edn. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2012), 286-291. 
81 ICJ Reports 2010, 403. 
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Statute82.	  This	  means	   that	   the	   ICJ’s	  opinion,	   if	   favorable	   for	   the	  organization	  which	   filed	   the	  request	  (having	  the	  Court	  recognized	  that	  the	  ILOAT,	  under	  Art	  XII	  of	  the	  ILOAT	  Statute,	  has	  exceeded	  its	  jurisdiction,	  or	  that	  there	  has	  been	  a	  fundamental	  flaw	  in	  procedure),	  may	  entail	  that	   the	   staff	   member	   will	   lose	   the	   compensation	   awarded	   to	   her.	   Therefore,	   in	   cases	  regarding	   the	   review	   of	   the	   decisions	   of	   the	   ILOAT,	   what	   is	   at	   stake	   is	   always	   a	   dispute	  between	  the	  official	  and	  the	  organization,	  rather	  than	  the	  clarification	  of	  a	  complex	  legal	  issue	  which	  falls	  under	  the	  competence	  of	  the	  UN	  specialized	  agencies.	  The	  second	  aspect	  that	  characterizes	  the	  procedure	  under	  Art.	  XII	  of	  the	  ILOAT	  Statute	  is	  that	   the	   law	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   ICJ’s	   reasoning	   –	   unlike	   what	   it	   happens	   in	   the	   other	  proceedings	  initiated	  by	  the	  UN	  specialized	  agencies	  pursuant	  to	  Art.	  65.1	  of	  the	  ICJ	  Statute	  –	  is	  the	  internal	  law	  of	  international	  organizations,	  namely	  the	  law	  governing	  the	  employment	  relationships	   between	   the	   staff	  members	   and	   the	   organization.	   Now,	  what	   I	  want	   to	   stress	  here	  is	  that	  this	  branch	  of	  law83	  follows	  sui	  generis	  principles	  very	  much	  different	  from	  those	  which	   define	   international	   law84.	   It	   is	   a	   self-­‐contained	   regime,	   not	   to	   be	   assimilated	   with	  international	  law,	  even	  though	  it	  does	  derive	  from	  the	  latter85,	  i.e.	  from	  both	  the	  treaty	  which	  established	   the	   organization	   and	   the	   Staff	   Regulations	   and	   Rules	   generally	   adopted	   by,	  respectively,	  the	  Assembly	  and	  the	  Secretariat	  of	  the	  organization86.	  The	  legal	  problems	  and	  questions	  to	  be	  investigated	  by	  the	  ICJ	  under	  the	  procedure	  governed	  by	  Art.	  XII	  of	  the	  ILOAT	  Statute	   are	   very	   different	   from	   those	   included	   in	   the	   scope	   of	   Art.	   96.2	   of	   the	   UN	   Charter.	  Furthermore,	   the	   applicable	   law	   is	   mainly	   contained	   in	   the	   organization’s	   founding	  agreement,	  in	  the	  headquarters	  agreement	  between	  the	  organization	  and	  the	  host	  State,	  in	  the	  ILOAT	   Statute,	   in	   the	   Staff	   Regulations	   and	  Rules,	   in	   the	   contract	   signed	  by	   the	   official	   and	  his/her	   employer	   and	   in	   the	   other	   not	   written	   sources	   of	   law87,	   rather	   than	   in	   sources	   of	  public	  international	  law	  stricto	  sensu88.	  It	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   me	   that	   the	   only	   way	   to	   prevent	   the	   risks	   of	   fragmentation	   in	   the	  regulation	  of	  the	  status	  of	  the	  international	  civil	  service	  (and	  the	  arbitrariness	  of	  international	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 On the (formally advisory) opinions of the ICJ  having been given a conclusive and binding status also with respect to 
disputes between international organizations and States, see Roberto Ago, “Binding Advisory Opinions of the 
International Court of Justice”, American Journal of International Law 85 (1991): 439. 
83 For what concerns the nature of this discipline, it cannot be shared the opinion of those who deny the legal character 
of the rules governing the status of international organizations’ staff members as well as the recognition of the officials 
as subjects of law; see Giorgio Balladore Pallieri, “Le droit interne des organisations internationals”, in Recueil des 
Cours de l’Académie de droit international de La Haye CXXI (1969), 13; Rolando Quadri, Diritto internazionale 
pubblico (Napoli: Liguori, 1968), 86. 
84 On the topic see recently D. Gallo, “Status, privilegi, immunità e tutela giurisdizionale dei funzionari delle 
organizzazioni internazionali”, in Diritto delle organizzazioni internazionali, ed. Angela Del Vecchio (Edizioni 
Scientifiche Italiane: Naples, 2012), 280-282. 
85 On the subject see Chittharanjan Félix Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International 
Organizations (2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 274. 
86 Authors such as Philippe Cahier, “Le droit interne des organisations internationals”, Revue générale de droit 
international public (1963): 573 and Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi, “Funzionario internazionale”, in Digesto delle 
discipline pubblicistiche (VII, Turin: UTET, 1991), 48, have already clearly demonstrated that the internal legal order 
of an international organization can be considered as independent from international law, even though it derives from it: 
there is no interdependence between the aspect concerning the origin of that legal order and that of its autonomy. 
87 On the sources of law governing employment relationships see, inter alia, C. Wilfred Jenks, The Proper Law of 
International Organizations (London: Stevens, 1962); Michael Barton Akehurst, The Law Governing Employment in 
International Organizations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967); Amerasinghe, Principles, 282-289; Felice 
Morgenstern, “The law applicable to international officials”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 18 (1969): 
739; Gallo, Status, 282-289.  




administrative	   tribunals)	   as	   well	   as	   to	   entail	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   law	   of	   international	  administrative	   tribunals89	   may	   be	   to	   empower	   the	   ICJ	   with	   the	   competence	   to	   develop	   a	  uniform	  regime	  governing	  staff	  disputes90.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  in	  this	  article	  I	  maintain	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  ICJ	  and	  ILOAT	  is	  grounded	  on	  a	  basic	  defect,	  that	  is,	  the	  lack	  of	   jus	  
standi	  and	   jus	   locus	  standi	   in	   judicio.	   In	  particular,	  as	  to	  the	  latter,	  the	  remedies	  provided	  by	  the	  ICJ	  in	  its	  advisory	  opinion	  of	  February	  2012	  are	  not	  conclusive;	  they	  do	  not	  entail	  a	  sort	  of	  
equivalent	   protection	   of	   the	   rights	   of	   the	   individual,	   such	   as	   the	   doctrine	   of	   equivalent	  protection	   established	   by	   the	   European	   Court	   of	   Human	  Rights	   to	   address	   the	   issue	   of	   the	  compatibility	  of	  EU	   law	  –	   including	  the	  case	   law	  of	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  of	   the	  EU	  –	  with	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights91.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  I	  believe	  that,	  as	  long	  as	  there	  is	  no	  drastic	  change	  of	  perspective	  at	  UN	  level	  that	  may	  lead	  to	  an	  amendment	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter	  as	  well	  as	  of	  the	  ICJ	  Statute,	  the	  ICJ	  is	  not	  the	  right	  forum	  to	  resort	  to	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  validity	  of	  a	  decision	  by	  the	  ILOAT.	  Only	  the	  full	  exercise	  of	  the	  right	  of	  access	  to	  the	  ICJ	  –	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  officials	  involved	  in	  the	  dispute	  –	  and	  the	  full	  respect	  of	  general	  principles	  of	  law	  –	  such	  as	  the	  equality	  of	  arms,	  the	  contradictoire92	  and	  the	  good	  administration	  of	  justice	  –	  may	  secure	  a	  fair	  instruction	  of	  the	  process	  and	  above	  all	  may	  ensure	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  ICJ	  and	  ILOAT	  may	  be	  compatible	  with	  the	  modern	  concepts	  and	  dimensions	  of	  due	  process93	  and,	  ultimately,	  justice.	  	  5.	   If	   the	   ICJ	   is	   not	   the	   right	   judge,	   in	  my	   opinion,	   to	   adjudicate	   staff	   disputes	   previously	  settled	  by	  the	  ILOAT,	  which	  would	  be	  the	  right	  judicial	  organ	  to	  do	  it?	  My	   opinion	   is	   that,	   as	   happened	   in	   the	   UN	   internal	   justice	   system,	   an	   appellate	   degree	  should	   be	   established	   for	   all	   staff	   disputes	   within	   international	   organizations.	   More	  specifically,	   as	   to	   the	   ILOAT,	   it	   seems	   to	   me	   that	   a	   tribunal	   should	   be	   instituted	   and	  empowered	   with	   the	   competence	   to	   rule	   as	   judge	   of	   second	   and	   last	   degree	   vested	   with	  power	  to	  review	  appeals	  against	  decisions	  taken	  by	  ILOAT	  within	  the	  same	  limits	  prescribed	  by	  Art.	  2	  of	  the	  Statute	  of	  the	  UN	  Appeals	  Tribunal	  (UNAsT)94,	  according	  to	  which	  the	  UNAsT	  shall	  be	  competent	  to	  hear	  and	  pass	  judgment	  on	  an	  appeal	  filed	  by	  the	  UN	  Dispute	  Tribunal	  if	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Recently, on the role and development of international administrative law see Melissa Thomas, Olufemi Elias, “The 
Role of International Administrative Law, in The Development”, in The Development, ed. Elias, 397-410; on the 
emergence of general principles on the international civil service see Francesco Salerno, Diritto internazionale (2nd. 
Padua: Cedam, 2011), 206. 
90 On the limits of the ICJ’s contribution to the development of international administrative law see Joanna Gomula, 
“The Review of Decisions of International Administrative Tribunals by the International Court of Justice”, in The 
Development, ed. Elias, 367-372; contra Pierre Pescatore, “Two Tribunals and One Court. Some Current Problems of 
International Staff Administration in the Jurisdiction of the ILO and UN Administrative Tribunals and the International 
Court of Justice”, in Towards More Effective Supervision by International Organizations. Essays in Honour of Henry 
G. Schermers, eds. Niels Blokker and A. Sam Muller (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), 225 and 230-237; Riddell, 
“Administrative Boards”, 75. 
91 On the notion of European “equivalent protection” of rights see, amongst others, P. De Hert and F. Korenica, The 
Doctrine of Equivalent Protection: Its Life and Legitimacy Before and After the European Union’s Accession to the 
European Convention on Human Rights, German Law Journal 13 (2012): 874, available at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol13-No7/PDF_Vol_13_No_07_874-
895_Developments_DeHertKorenica.pdf. 
92 On the topic see the contributions in Hélène Ruiz Fabri and Jean-Marc Sorel (eds.), Le principe du contradictoire 
devant les juridictions internationales (Paris: Pedone, 2004). 
93 On due process and international administrative tribunals see Maritza Struyvenberg, “International Administrative 
Law: Due Process in the Justice System”, in “International Administrative Tribunals in a Changing World: United 
Nations Administrative Tribunal Conference organized under the Auspices of the Executive Office of the Secretary-
General, New York, Friday, 9 November 2007”, eds. Katerina Papanikolaou and Martha Hiskaki  (London: Esperia, 
2008), 173-180. 
94 See supra, § 1. 
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the	   latter	   has	   exceeded	   its	   jurisdiction,	   failed	   to	   exercise	   its	   jurisdiction,	   or	   if	   it	   erred	   on	   a	  question	  of	  fact,	  law,	  or	  procedure95.	  Moreover,	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   the	  changes	  occurred	  at	  UN	   level,	   the	  need	   for	  a	  reform	  within	  ILO	   as	   well	   as	   within	   other	   international	   organizations	   through	   which	   granting	   to	   the	  international	   organizations’	   staff	   members	   the	   same	   right	   of	   access	   to	   justice	   than	   those	  accorded	  to	  their	  employers	  is	  even	  more	  urgent	  if	  we	  consider	  that	  the	  ICJ	  itself	  seems	  to	  act	  as	   judge	   vested	   with	   a	   power	   of	   review	   of	   a	   tribunal’s	   decision	   very	  much	   similar	   to	   that	  exercised	  by	  a	  tribunal	  of	  appellate	  degree96.	  Well,	  such	  a	  hybrid	  –	  advisory	  proceedings	  that	  are	   judicial	   in	  character,	  but	  whose	  procedural	  rules	  do	  not	  satisfy	   the	  equality	  of	  arms	  –	   is	  clearly	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  justice	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  international	  principles	  and	  norms	  aimed	  at	  safeguarding	  the	  individual	  and	  his	  fundamental	  right	  of	  access	  to	  justice.	  	  In	  conclusion,	   international	  organizations	  should	   take	  measures	   to	  establish	  an	  appellate	  tribunal97.	   And	   it	   is	   the	   ILOAT	   that,	   insofar	   as	   the	   most	   representative	   of	   international	  administrative	  tribunals,	  should	  take	  the	  initiative.	  My	  main	  argument	  is	  that,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  provisions	  governing	  employment	  relationships,	  the	  development,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  uniform	  interpretation	   and	   application,	   of	   the	   internal	   law	   of	   international	   organizations	   must	   be	  ensured,	  rather	  than	  by	  the	  ICJ,	  by	  international	  administrative	  tribunals.	  Due	  to	  their	  nature	  and	  mission,	   the	   latter	  are	  better	  equipped	   to	  settle	  staff	  disputes	  between	  an	   international	  organization	  and	  its	  staff	  members98.	  	  As	  for	  the	  ICJ	  Advisory	  Opinion	  of	  February	  2012	  on	  Judgment	  No.	  2867	  of	  the	  ILOAT,	  an	  important	  observation	  must	  be	  made	  on	  the	  approach	  taken	  by	  the	  Court.	  Not	  only	  did	  the	  ICJ	  choose	  to	  acknowledge,	  once	  and	  for	  all,	  the	  limits	  of	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  ILOAT	  –	  limits	  it	  had	  already	  emphasized	  in	  previous	  advisory	  opinions	  on	  judgments	  of	  the	  UNAT	  and	  ILOAT	  –,	  but	  it	  also	  brought	  attention	  to	  the	  new	  UN	  internal	  justice	  system	  and,	  finally,	  questioned	  the	   compatibility	   of	   the	   procedure	   provided	   for	   by	  Art.	   XII	   of	   the	   ILOAT	   Statute99	  with	   the	  “present-­‐day	   principle	   of	   equality	   of	   access	   to	   courts	   and	   tribunals”100.	   In	  my	   opinion,	   this	  must	   be	  understood	   as	   a	   recognition,	   by	   the	   ICJ	   itself,	   of	   the	   crucial	   function	  performed	  by	  international	  administrative	  tribunals	  in	  promoting,	  at	  international	  level,	  the	  right	  of	  access	  to	  justice.	  In	  this	  respect,	  I	  will	  not	  be	  surprised	  if	  the	  ICJ	  Opinion	  were	  interpreted,	  first	  of	  all	  by	  international	  organizations,	  as	  an	  implicit	   invitation	  for	  those	  international	  organizations	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 On the need for a double degree within international organizations’ internal justice systems see David Ruzié, “Le 
double degré de juridiction dans le contentieux de la fonction publique internationale”, in Mélanges offerts à Hubert 
Thierry: l’évolution du droit International (Paris: Pedone, 1999), 369-381. 
96 In this sense see also Gomula, The Review, 357. 
97 To my knowledge, the only alternative (but perhaps, at present, less feasible) solution  would be to rely on Art. 2.10 
of the UNAsT Statute, according to which “[t]he Appeals Tribunal shall be competent to hear and pass judgment on an 
application filed against a specialized agency brought into relationship with the United Nations […] or other 
international organization or entity established by a treaty and participating in the common system of conditions of 
service, where a special agreement has been concluded between the agency, organization or entity concerned and the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations to accept the terms of the jurisdiction of the Appeals Tribunal, consonant with 
the present statute”. The article states as well that “[s]uch special agreement may only be concluded if the agency, 
organization or entity utilizes a neutral first instance process that includes a written record and a written decision 
providing reasons, fact and law”. 
98 See also Suzanne Bastid, “Have the U. N. Administrative Tribunals Contributed to the Development of International 
Law?”, in Transnational Law in a Changing Society. Essays in Honor of Philip C. Jessup, eds. Wolfgang Friedmann, 
Louis Henkin, Oliver Lissitzyn (New York-London: Columbia University Press, 1972), 298-312; August Reinisch, 
“The Immunity of International Organizations and the Jurisdiction of their Administrative Tribunals”, Chinese Journal 
of International Law 7 (2008): 285, 286. 
99 In combination with Art. 65 of the ICJ Statute and Art. 96 of the UN Charter. 
100 See para. 44 of the Advisory Opinion. 
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which	   have	   not	   yet	   established	   administrative	   tribunals	   or	   accepted	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   the	  ILOAT	  or	  the	  UN	  internal	  judicial	  bodies	  to	  do	  so	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  For	  the	  organizations	  that,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  have	  already	  done	   so,	   I	   believe	   that	   from	   the	  Opinion	   there	   emerges	   an	  implicit	  invitation	  to	  establish	  tribunals	  that	  are	  vested	  with	  the	  power	  of	  reviewing	  appeals	  against	  judgments	  rendered	  by	  first	  instance	  courts.	  
